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THE “GREAT GAME”: MONGOLIA BETWEEN
RUSSIA AND CHINA
Eric Her
Throughout history it has been the fate of small nations surrounded by
larger neighbors either to be divided or absorbed by the larger nations, or sur-
vives as buffer states by mastering balance-of-power politics and skillful diplo-
macy. Ever since pushed into Far East and China extended its domination north
of the Great Wall, Mongolia has been one arena of the “great game” in the
struggle for empire between Russia and China. The Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu
characterized Mongolia’s geopolitical position as a “critical condition, like piled
up eggs, in the midst of neighboring nations.”1
Russians have historically regarded Mongolia as a classic buffer state. On
the other hand, Chinese have viewed Mongolia as historically part of China.
After the fall of the Manchu dynasty in 1911, Mongolia asserted, and has pre-
served, its independence as a nation in the midst of two hegemonic powers
while other nations in similar circumstances have not enjoyed the same fate.
Russian policy initially sought to preserve Mongolian autonomy from China
but did not support Mongolian independence, in order to maintain Russia-
China relations and not alarm Japan. After 1917, the Soviet Union did eventually
support Mongolian independence but was not firm in this support. China, on
the other hand, persistently attempted to absorb Mongolia into the new Chi-
nese nation-state. This paper briefly examines the triangular diplomacy between
Russia, Mongolia and China from 1911.
THE 1911 CHINESE REVOLUTION AND
MONGOLIAN INDEPENDENCE
Following the October 1911 Chinese revolution, the Mongolians declared
independence in December 1911 and proclaimed the Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu
leader of an independent Mongolian nation. Mongolia had enjoyed a special
relationship with the Manchu court and Mongolian’s believed that Mongolia
was not an integral part of China. Initially Russian and Chinese newspapers
reported the Mongolian declaration of independence, but subsequently dropped
the term “independence” and adopted the term “autonomy”. Chinese main-
tained the Mongolia was an integral part of China, but at the time, Beijing did not
have the military strength to force the integration of Mongolia into the new
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Chinese republic. Yuan Shikai, the President of the Republic of China, made a
personal appeal for unity. After several unanswered telegrams from Yuan, the
Jebtsundamba responded: “We should establish ourselves in amity and peace
as neighboring states each adhering to its own territory and preserving its
integrity.” Hinting at involving Russia, or even Japan, as a protector of Mongolia’s
fragile independence he went on to say, “it will be to our mutual advantage to
invite a neighboring state to act as intermediary.” The Jebsundamba Khutukhtu
believed that under the unrelenting pressure from China, Urga had no other
option than to seek the support of czarist Russia.2 President Yuan failed to
persuade the Jebsundamba Khutukhtu to rescind Mongolia’s declaration of
independence and eventually turned to Russia for help.
Within the czarist government at the time, Russian toward Mongolia was
also being debated. The czarist government had not recognized Mongolia’s
independence, but was providing Urga significant political, financial, and mili-
tary support. In Russo-Japanese negotiations as early as 1907, they considered
dividing Mongolia into outer and inner zones with Russian and Japanese spheres
of influence respectively. Japan and Russia reconsidered this same idea in 1912.
In 1911, following Mongolia’s declaration of independence, the Russian foreign
minister, S.D.Sazonov advocated that Moscow assume a role limited to media-
tion, while the finance minister, V.N. Kokovczev pushed for a much more forceful
policy. Casanova prevailed and Moscow told Mongolian authorities that Rus-
sia would not assist Mongolia in obtaining independence, but would resist the
growing Chinese influence. Russia’s objective was to preserve Mongolia’s au-
tonomy from China and ensure its own commercial and other rights in Mongolia
granted earlier by the Manchu court. Moscow adopted a policy supporting an
“autonomous” Outer Mongolia that remained part of China and sought to as-
sume the role of mediator between Beijing and Urga. To this end, St.Petersburg
initiated an intricate diplomatic initiative involving both Urga and Beijing.3 How-
ever, Beijing rejected Russian mediation and in’ June 1912 told the Russian
envoy to Beijing, V.N.Krupenskoy, that China- Mongolia relations had to be
settled through direct negotiations between Beijing and Urga without Russian
interference 4
Initially rebuffed by Beijing, StPetersburg decided to initiate secret nego-
tiations with the Urga authorities. These began in October 1912 and on Novem-
ber 3; the two parties signed a treaty that pledged St. Petersburg to assist Outer
Mongolia in preserving its “autonomy,” maintaining a national army, and keep-
ing Mongolia free of Chinese troops and colonizers. Russian authorities wrote
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this agreement even before negotiations started. Mongolian negotiators ob-
jected to the division of Mongolia into outer and inner spheres and did not want
to sign the agreement. Russian authorities told the Mongolians that Chinese
troops were already marching toward Urga unless Mongolia signed the agree-
ment, Russia would not defend Mongolia.
Chinese authorities were indignant about the Russian-Mongolian agree-
ment and reluctantly agreed to Russia-Chinese negotiations in a last attempt to
assert Chinese domination over Outer Mongolia. Sino-Russian negotiations
began in November 1912. China wanted recognized of its sovereignty over Outer
Mongolia, but Russia insisted on three conditions: no Chinese troops, no Chi-
nese administration, and no Chinese colonization in Outer Mongolia. During
these bilateral negotiations alternatively with Mongolia and then China, St.
Petersburg took no initiative to open tripartite discussions. But Urga, alarmed
by the Sino-Russian negotiations, was concerned that any agreement would be
at the expense of Mongolia and push for a seat at the table in the Russian-
Chinese talks, in May 1913, Mongolia demanded to join the Russian-Chinese
negotiations. The Russians rejected this proposal, arguing that involving
Mongolia in any negotiations at the present stage may only confuse the discus-
sions and compromise agreements already reached with Beijing. The Russian
consul general in Urga, A.Y. Miller, tried to reassure the Mongolians, telling
them that St. Petersburg would secure the “full autonomy” of Outer Mongolia.
Urga, unappeased by this argument, continued to press the issue. Also, in
the spring of 1913, Mongolia’s interior minister, Tserenchimid, attempted to go
to Japan to seek Tokyo’s assistance, but was prevented from doing so by Rus-
sia and China. In the meantime, China dispatched troops to Inner Mongolia, and
Urga responded by sending troops to resist the Chinese invasion. In July the
Mongolian foreign minister informed Beijing it would not recognize any Sino-
Russian agreement. On August 31, 1913, Beijing secretly approached the Mon-
golian government and proposed opening Sino-Mongolian negotiations. For
the first time since declaring independence the Mongolians agreed to allow
Chinese diplomats to travel to Urga for talks. Russia strongly opposed Mongolia-
China talks and in exchange for Urga dropping its demand to participate in the
Russian-Chinese negotiations and canceling scheduled talks with Beijing, Rus-
sia agreed to open tripartite negotiations, in which Urga would enjoy equal
status with StPetersburg and Beijing, after the conclusion of a Sino-Russian
agreement.
After a year of difficult negotiations and a Russian to break off negotia-
tions if China did not accept Russia’s demands, StPetersburg and Beijing signed
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an agreement. Russia recognized Chinese “suzerainty” over Outer Mongolia in
exchange for Chinese recognition; of Mongolian “autonomy”. St.Petersburg
also agreed to facilitate the establishment of relations between Urga and Beijing.5
Russia achieved its diplomatic objectives of establishing Mongolia as a buffer
by maintaining it autonomy. China was unhappy with the agreement but Mongolia
felt betrayed and sent a protest to Beijing saying that the Mongolian govern-
ment considered “relations with China severed forever.”6 On December 16, 1913,
Urga notified St. Petersburg that it terminated relations with China did not rec-
ognize the validity of the Sino-Russian declaration recognizing Chinese “suzer-
ainty” over Outer Mongolia.
Tripartite negotiations were opened in Kiakhta on September 8, 1914. Urga
expressed the hope that during these negotiations St.Petersburg woolies sup-
port its desire for independence Mongolia that included all of greater Mongolia.
StPetersburg urged Mongolia not to push for total independence and informed
Mongolian negotiators that the Russian government had never intended to
support Urga’s desire for an independent greater Mongolia. The Russian and
Chinese objective in this negotiation was to prevail upon Mongolia to accept
the Russian-Chinese agreement and press Mongolia to remove its troops from
Inner Mongolia. Without Russian support Mongolia had no hope realize its
dream of an independence greater Mongolia. A June 1915 tripartite agreement
afforded the broadest possible “autonomy” for Outer Mongolia at the time, and
paved the way for its eventual total independence from China. The agreements
included provisions on trade, taxes, and other matters but no boundary agree-
ment, however, neutral zones between outer and Inner Mongolia was estab-
lished.
Beijing made its future intentions clear when it dismissed the tripartite
agreement as “nothing but a diplomatic trick of a temporary character.”7 The
conditions under which the Kiakhta treaty was concluded changed dramatically
two years later with the overthrow of the czar and the October Revolution in
Russia. The new Bolshevik government was unable to assist Mongolia in resist-
ing China’s attempts to reassert full control over Outer Mongolia. Under tremen-
dous pressure from Beijing, the Khutukhtu “petitioned” for the abolition of
Mongolia’s autonomy in November 1919 and China gladly “complied.” The
reassertion of Chinese control did not last long, however. Mongolia became a
battlefield in the Russian civil war and the White Russians drove the Chinese
from Urga in 1921. But, the Whites’ victory soon turned to defeat at the hands of
the Bolsheviks.
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ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MONGOLIAN REPUBLIC
With the blessings of the Jebsundamba Khutukhtu and the support of the
Soviet Union, Mongolian revolutionaries established a Marxist regime in Urga
in 1921. But the Soviet Union, like czarist Russia, still viewed Mongolia as a
bargaining chip in its relations with China; hi May 1924 the Soviet Union recog-
nized China’s “full sovereignty” over Outer Mongolia. However, a month later,
following the death of the Jebsundamba Khutukhtu, Mongolia declared its in-
dependence as the Mongolian People’s Republic (MRP). China’s internal prob-
lems prevented it from reasserting control and the most it could do was protest
Soviet-Mongolian agreements.
Mongolian independence was bolstered two later at the Yalta Conference
when the Allies agreed that the quo in Mongolia be preserved following the war.
The Nationalist Chinese government grudgingly agreed to recognize Mongolia’s
independence as a precondition to concluding the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friend-
ship and Alliance in August 1945.
COMMUNIST CHINA’S QUEST FOR INFLUENCE
Chinese communists were also reluctant to acknowledge Mongolian inde-
pendence and harbored irredentist sentiments. In an interview with Edgar Snow
in 1936, Mao Zedong expressed the dream that the “Outer Mongolian republic
will . . . become part of the Chinese federation8.” While in Moscow in February
1950, Mao Zedong raised the issue with Stalin. Although Mao expressed his
desire for the eventual “reunion” of Mongolia with China, he did not allow his
irredentist dreams to prevent the conclusion of a Sino-Soviet treaty.9 The MPR
and the USSR were apprehensive about China’s ambitions in Mongolia and
insisted on a Chinese declaration acknowledging Mongolian independence.10
Despite Beijing’s declaration affirming Mongolia’s independence, Beijing
raised the issue again in October 1954 during Khrushchev’s first trip to China
after Stalin’s death. Under intense pressure from Mao, Zhou Inlay reluctantly
broached the issue with Khrushchev. Khrushchev, according to his memoirs,
declined to speak for Mongolia but not voice strong opposition.” Although the
Soviets may have refused to reconsider the status of the MPR, subsequent
developments in Russian-Mongolian-Chinese tripartite relations give credence
to suggestions that the Soviets acquiesced to China’s demand to assume a
dominant role in Mongolia.12
An Asian diplomat in Ulaanbaatar characterized the growing Chinese in-
fluence in Mongolia during the 1950s by saying: “The momentum of Chinese
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initiative is so great, the attract force of Chinese dynamism so overpowering,
that it is hard to see how, in the long run, Russia can maintain her position
here.”13 China also encouraged pan-Mongolian nationalism by constructing a
Chinggis Khan mausoleum in Inner Mongolia although his birthplace was in
Outer Mongolia.
As Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated in the late 1950s, Soviet compla-
cency over Chinese ambitions in Mongolia turned to alarm. The Soviets re-
sponded to the Chinese challenge. Mongolia was caught in the middle of the
Sino-Soviet dispute. Ulaanbaatar’s initial wish was to remain neutral and a high-
level official commented that the dispute would not influence Mongolia’s rela-
tions with the PRC or Soviet Union, but its precarious geopolitical circumstances
made it impossible to remain neutral for long. Following the open spilt between
the USSR and PRC after the Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU in October
1961, Mongolia adopted a pro-Soviet position.14 In June 1962, Mongolia was the
first Asian state to become a full member of the Council on Mutual Economic
Assistance /COMECON/. 15 this was a clear indication that the MPR had de-
cided to closely cooperate with the USSR to the exclusion of China.
Beijing appealed to Mongolian in its bid to gain influence in Ulaanbaatar.
During the commemoration of the 800th anniversary of Chinggis Khan’s birth in
1962, the Mongolians dedicated a statue at a location believed to be his birth-
place. The PRC also celebrated the event and supported the MPR festivities.
Beijing, with both nationalistic and racist overtones, portrayed Chinggis Khan
as a positive “cultural force.” An article published in Lishi yanjiu argued that
Khan had played a “progressive” role by building Mongolia into a “great power”
and developing relations with Europe, breaking down all barriers between East
and West.16 Not surprisingly, the Soviets criticized the celebrations. They char-
acterized Chinggis Khan as a reactionary “who had overrun, looted, and burned
most of what was then Russia” and said his “bloody invasions” were a “great
historical tragedy,”17
CHINA PLAYS ITS CARD
On December 16, 1962 China announced that Tsedenbal would travel to
Beijing to sign an agreement to settle the boundary. After demarcating the bound-
ary, a treaty was signed in Ulaanbaatar on July 2, 1964.’8 To forestall further
degeneration in Sino-Mongolian relations, Beijing wanted to assure Ulaanbaatar
that China had relinquished its irredentist claims in Mongolia; a boundary treaty
was the most unambiguous way to achieve this.19
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This boundary agreement closed a long chapter in Sino-Mongolian rela-
tions. At the time of the 1915 Kiakhta treaty, Beijing had agreed to delimit the
boundary, but this was never done, and China eventually reasserted control
over outer Mongolia for a brief period.20 After the Chinese Nationalists’ recogni-
tion of the MPR “ in her existing boundaries” in 1946, no boundary settlement
was negotiated. Mao’s statement in the 1930s concerning the future reintegra-
tion of Outer Mongolia into China and his later comments to Stalin and
Khrushchev in the 1950s on the same question underscored Chinese irredentism.
Despite recognizing the MPR in 1950 and affirming the PRC’s respect for Mon-
golian independence and territorial integrity, Beijing was reluctant to negotiate
a boundary settlement.
Mongolians also had reason to be apprehensive about the Russians’ com-
mitment to Mongolian independence. The 1954 Mao-Khrushchev meeting dem-
onstrated that the Soviets still viewed Mongolia’s status as “negotiable,” just
as czarist Russia had four decades earlier.2'
Negotiating a boundary settlement was clearly a diplomatic move by Beijing
to counterbalance the growing Soviet-Mongolian alliance and attempt to sal-
vage deteriorating Sino-Mongolian relations to maintain a favorable balance of
power in this triangular relationship.22 recognizing a boundary dividing China
and Mongolia was Beijing’s last card. No doubt China hoped that a flexible
approach to the boundary dispute would persuade Ulaanbaatar at least to make
a more balanced position in Mongolian-Russian-Chinese triangular relations.23
The Chinese repeatedly expressed the hope that the boundary treaty would
improve Sino-Mongolian relations. A Rennin Rebio editorial published the day
Tsedenbal arrived in Beijing to sign the stressed the intimacy of their friendship
and said:
We are convinced that ... the signed of the Sino-Mongolian Boundary
Treaty will be a positive contribution to the strengthening of fraternal friendship
and solidarity between the Chinese and Mongolian peoples.
CONCLUSION
At a Conference on the Question of Ideological Work held in Ulaanbaatar
in January 1963, just two weeks after the signing of the boundary treaty,
Tsedenbal reminded the Chinese of their past domination that ended through
the assistance of the Russians who helped Mongolians realize their “dreams of
freedom, independence and happiness.”25 Mao personally responded on July
10, 1964, just a week after the exchange of the final instruments of ratification of
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the boundary treaty by that saying under the guise of helping Mongolia gain
independence, the Soviets had in fact began to dominate the MPR.26
Now, three decades after the boundary treaty, China and Mongolia remain
extremely sensitive about their historical relationship. The triangular Mongo-
lian-Russian-Chinese relationship is entering a new period of flux and possible
instability. Democratic Mongolia could emerge as the focal point for a reinvigo-
rated pan-Mongolian nationalism that will surely alarm Russia and China. One
Russian scholar has argued that now Russia and China share a common interest
in preserving national unity that could be threatened by pan-Mongolism.27 Rus-
sia also needs Mongolia as a buffer state to shield it from an awakening Chinese
dragon that is becoming an economic and military power. And apparently the
legacy of the Chinese empire lingers in the minds of Chinese. In 1992, Chinas
State Security Ministry revived the specter of Chinese irredentism when it is-
sued a statement saying that: “As of now, the Mongolian region comprises
three parts that belong to three countries” - the Russian regions of Tuva and
Buryatia, Mongolia, and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region - but “the
Mongolian region has ancient times been Chinese territory.”
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